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Abstract 
Community safety sector stakeholders in Merseyside are finding it increasingly difficult to remain 
financially sustainable and deliver the necessary community safety, crime prevention and 
diversionary services. Over the course of the immediate past parliament, Merseyside Local 
Authorities within the Liverpool City Region Combined Authority (LCRCA) and the police force area 
had to restructure staffing and service provision extensively in order to deliver efficiency savings 
of over £650m. This research study used a mixed-methodological approach to explain how cuts to 
funding impacted on the delivery of public safety priorities under the coalition government (2010-
2015). We discovered that the cuts had severe repercussions not just in terms of stakeholders 
capability to provide key services but also for the morale of their staff. Based on feedback from 
the study participants, we project a further 33% cutback in funding over the course of the current 
parliament though subsequent more favourable Government announcements suggest a more 
modest figure of up to 15%. This undoubtedly will result in the further streamlining of public services 
with potentially serious ramifications for levels of public safety. 
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1. Background and Executive Summary 
Since the emergence of the coalition government in 2010, funding for public services has nose-
dived across England and Wales. Reduction in funding is directly linked to the government’s plan 
to reduce the national deficit. Not only has funding reduced across the board, the nature of funding 
has changed markedly thereby further increasing uncertainty. 
 
With the challenge of having to achieve efficiencies of over £650m over the period 2010 to 2016 
and the prospect of further cuts to come within the next few years, the Merseyside Local 
Authorities within the Liverpool City Region Combined Authority (LCRCA), and the police force 
area are experiencing monumental change.  The crucial role of the community safety workforce in 
maintaining service levels for the 1.4m residents of the five metropolitan areas of Merseyside 
cannot be over-emphasised. They combine the delivery of statutory and non-statutory services 
with the targeting of resources where they are most needed. Ensuring that community safety 
stakeholders across Merseyside remain financially sustainable is becoming increasingly difficult in 
a climate of deeper funding cuts. 
 
This study used a mixed-methodological approach to capture and detail the depth and breadth of 
financial cuts among a wide range of Merseyside Community Safety Partners (MCSP) since 2010. 
 
The partners include: 
 Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner, Merseyside; 
 Merseyside Police; 
 Knowsley Community Safety Partnership; 
 Liverpool Community Safety Partnership; 
 Sefton Community Safety Partnership; 
 St. Helens Community Safety Partnership; 
 Wirral Community Safety Partnership; 
 Her Majesty’s Prison Service; 
 Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service; 
 Merseyside Community Rehabilitation Company; 
 Merseyside’s Registered Social Landlords; and 
 Travelsafe. 
 
In addition to the CSPs, the study also outlines how the cuts have affected the five Youth Offending 
Services across Merseyside and the National Probation Service. 
 
Furthermore, the research uncovers the scale and nature of financial reductions that each of the 
stakeholders will be required to make beyond the current financial year (i.e. post April 2016).  It is 
important to stress that we conducted the study and solicited stakeholder views and relevant 
information in the autumn of 2015 just prior to the announcement of the Comprehensive Spending 
Review and that the funding position of community safety partner organisations has since 
changed, in some cases significantly. 
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We encountered problems collecting comprehensive data on the extent of expenditure cuts in the 
community safety sphere and also found it difficult to gauge their impact since funding is just one 
of a number of factors influencing levels of community safety, real and perceived.   
 
Whereas there was ample funding for community safety, crime prevention and diversionary 
services prior to 2010 especially in deprived areas suffering from a high incidence of crime and anti-
social behaviour, most stakeholders have experienced significant spending cutbacks in the period 
2010-2015. These cuts have also led to marked staffing reductions.  
 
Community safety service providers have had to operate in a city region which continues to face 
some of the most serious socio-economic problems in the country - a region where there are 
relatively large concentrations of vulnerable individuals and communities either at risk of entering 
into criminality or becoming the victims of crime.   
 
Spending cuts have forced all community safety bodies to focus on core, mandatory services and 
pare back discretionary spending, introduce efficiency measures and adopt a targeted, risk-based 
approach and time limited interventions.    
 
There is widespread concern that lack of funding for preventive measures, especially diversionary 
measures, could result in growing demands being placed on the criminal justice system.  Since 
stakeholders have interlocking agendas and tackle inter-related problems, cuts in their respective 
budgets are having significant knock-on effects on their sister bodies.  
 
Most stakeholders felt that public confidence in service providers has not been dented so far by 
austerity as they have maintained a good standard of services and done their best to maintain 
frontline services. There seems to be a perception that they are doing their best in difficult 
circumstances and involvement of the public in the rationalisation of services may have helped. 
   
There is concern, however, that the recent upturn in recorded crime, especially incidence of 
violence against the person, which has led to crime levels returning to 2011 levels, could damage 
public confidence, notwithstanding the fact that some of the increase has been due to improved 
reporting.   
 
Austerity has had a largely detrimental effect upon the morale of staff working in the sphere of 
community safety, crime prevention and diversionary services.  Cuts have variously led to 
restructuring, mergers, voluntary or compulsory redundancies, redeployment, changes to working 
hours, additional responsibilities and workload. This has in turn affected job satisfaction and 
caused uncertainty, worry, additional stress, sickness and loss of expertise.   
 
Many local authorities have been particularly badly hit by staff cuts. Frustration with the 
increasingly limited scope for action could tip into disillusionment if cuts persist. The prospect of 
further cuts is a general dampener on morale. Organisations which have sought to adjust working 
cultures, scrutinise closely their staff’s use of time, innovate and adapt and maintain a good 
reputation with service users have softened the impact of cuts on staff morale.   
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Going forward to the end of the current parliament in 2020, a projection of around 33% further cuts 
are expected. Further disruption to funding will trigger further cutbacks to research and 
intelligence units forcing many stakeholders to rely more on soft intelligence with the exception 
of Liverpool which despite a reduction in analytical ability still has such expertise. 
 
In view of what lies ahead, there is growing appetite amongst the MCSP stakeholders to consider 
some possible coping mechanisms which may help to mitigate these pressures. One such 
mechanism is to pursue an interoperable and collaborative working agenda in the form of a Pan-
Merseyside strategy. Whilst taking into account the peculiarities of the different jurisdictions of 
MCSP stakeholders and the continuing need to respect local delivery, priorities and funding 
decisions, such partnership working could focus on areas presenting common challenges 
including: the exploitation of children and young people; Domestic violence; Hate crime; Organised 
crime; and Neighbourhood anti-social behaviour. 
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2. The Social, Economic and Demographic Configuration of Merseyside 
Numerous studies have shown that crime and its determinants are closely linked to the 
demographic, social and economic contexts in which victims and perpetrators find themselves 
(Kelly, 2000). In recent decades, Britain’s community safety agenda has been shaped by critical 
issues linked to socio-demographics and economics of communities. Some of these policy drivers 
include issues like poverty, social exclusion, income inequality, unemployment and social mobility, 
educational attainment, age distribution, gender dynamics and urbanisation (Webster and 
Kingston, 2014). There is no gainsaying that the changing face of the country’s social, demographic 
and economic landscape has had direct and indirect knock-on effects on community safety 
(Whitworth, 2012). 
 
It is difficult to separate the historical antecedents of Merseyside from its contemporary social and 
economic challenges. Over a period of at least two hundred years, Merseyside (and Liverpool in 
particular) has experienced the extremes of opulence and acute need. During this period, the 
economic prosperity of the region was largely undergirded by the emergence of a globally 
renowned port which enabled flourishing international trade. Merchandise like salt, slaves and raw 
materials thrived during the 18th and 19th centuries (Wilks-Heeg, 2003).   
 
Societal prosperity is usually a magnet for people. Therefore, as a result of a thriving economy, 
Merseyside and Liverpool in particular attracted people from all over the world. The population of 
the region peaked during the 1930s (Sykes et al., 2013).  
 
However, following a lengthy period of economic boom, the good fortunes of Merseyside nose-
dived rapidly soon thereafter due in part to heavy and sustained bombing experienced during the 
Second World War, unfavourable economic restructuring and key planning decisions (Sykes et al., 
2013).  
 
This section presents a synopsis of the historic decline in the population of Merseyside.  An attempt 
is also made to explain how this decline triggered enormous social problems including crime and 
how it affected economic regeneration efforts. Later parts of the section focus on an overview of 
more contemporary indicators of demographic, social and economic status within a framework of 
crime and community safety. 
 
2.1. Merseyside’s Historic Population Decline 
From the beginning of the 1980s to the middle of the first decade of the current millennium, no 
other English Region witnessed a faster and larger fall in population than Merseyside. During this 
25 year period, the population of Merseyside fell by approximately 7% (Dorling et al., 2008). This 
drop in population was the legacy of the severe economic hardship which the region had endured 
since the 1970s.  
 
To contextualise their findings, Dorling et al. (2008) showed that the East of England experienced 
the highest population increase between 1981 and 2006, an increase of 23%. Conversely, the North 
West and Scotland witnessed population declines of 1% during the same period. As shown in Figure 
2.1, the population of Merseyside fell significantly during the period. 
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Dorling and his team also showed that between 1970 and 2000, Merseyside gradually rose through 
the ranks to become the region with the highest share of people classed as breadline poor 
alongside Scotland. Figures 2.2 to 2.6 capture this transition. 
 
Figure 2.1: Percentage Population Change 1981-2006  
 
Data Source: Dorling et al. (2008)  
 
Figure 2.2: Percentage Population Who Were Bread-line Poor (1970) 
 
Data Source: Dorling et al. (2008)  
 
23
18
16 15
13 12 11 10 10
5 5
3
0
-1 -1
-7
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
E
as
t
S
o
u
th
 W
e
st
W
e
st
S
o
u
th
N
o
rt
h
e
rn
 Ir
e
la
n
d
S
o
u
th
 E
as
t
E
as
t 
Y
o
rk
sh
ir
e
 &
 L
in
co
ln
sh
ir
e
E
as
t 
M
id
la
n
d
s
Lo
n
d
o
n
W
al
e
s
W
e
st
 M
id
la
n
d
s
Y
o
rk
sh
ir
e
N
o
rt
h
 E
as
t 
&
 C
u
m
b
ri
a
N
o
rt
h
 W
e
st
S
co
tl
an
d
M
e
rs
e
ys
id
e
%
27
26 25 25 24 24 23 23 22 21 21 21 20 20 19
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
S
co
tl
an
d
N
o
rt
h
 E
as
t 
&
 C
u
m
b
ri
a
Y
o
rk
sh
ir
e
M
e
rs
e
ys
id
e
N
o
rt
h
 W
e
st
Lo
n
d
o
n
E
as
t 
Y
o
rk
sh
ir
e
 &
 L
in
co
ln
sh
ir
e
E
as
t 
M
id
la
n
d
s
W
al
e
s
S
o
u
th
 E
as
t
W
e
st
 M
id
la
n
d
s
S
o
u
th
 W
e
st
E
as
t
S
o
u
th
W
e
st
%
Implications for Austerity for Community Safety within Merseyside 
9 
 
Figure 2.3: Percentage Population Who Were Bread-line Poor (1980) 
 
Data Source: Dorling et al. (2008)  
 
Figure 2.4: Percentage Population Who Were Bread-line Poor (1990) 
 
Data Source: Dorling et al. (2008)  
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Figure 2.5: Percentage Population Who Were Bread-line Poor (2000) 
 
Data Source: Dorling et al. (2008)  
 
Dorling defined ‘bread-line poverty’ as “people living below a relative poverty line, and as such 
excluded from participating in the norms of society” (Dorling et al., 2008 p. 18). The analysis reveals 
a stark north-south divide with the south of England exhibiting fewer traits of poverty. Even more 
worryingly, it shows that by the beginning of the current millennium roughly a third of Merseyside 
residents were living beneath the poverty line. 
 
Poverty can be demoralising. It often creates a sense of insecurity and an inferiority complex which 
trigger a process of detachment from the rest of society (Pemberton et al, 2013). Evidence shows 
that there are strong links between social isolation and crime. People with weaker feelings of 
societal belonging not only become vulnerable to criminals but can also become exposed to the 
“underworld” (Patel, 2013). 
 
Poverty triggered high levels of polarisation and segregation across Merseyside which 
consequently led to stronger feelings of isolation and weaker feelings of belonging. Following 
population and economic decline in Merseyside, Dorling et al. (2008) used the ‘anomie index’ to 
capture how the feelings of loneliness change over time. The computation of this index of 
loneliness is based on a weighted combination of the following indicators: 
 Numbers of non-married adults; 
 Number of 1-person households; 
 Number of people who moved to their current address within the last year; and 
 Number of people renting privately.  
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Just over 375,000 people across Merseyside were lonely and isolated in 1971. By 1981, some 20,000 
more people had become lonely taking the number to roughly 397,000. Merseyside witnessed the 
most significant rise in levels of fragmentation during the 1981 to 1991 decade. There was a 4 
percentage point increase (77,000 people) in the number of people who had become socially 
isolated. By the beginning of the current millennium, approximately 480,000 residents of 
Merseyside (24%) were classified as socially isolated. 
 
The changing dynamics of Merseyside’s population provided one of the biggest challenges to 
those tasked with pursuing the region’s regeneration. The rapid loss of talented segments of the 
population to other parts of the country and to the rest of the world made it difficult to attract 
new businesses (Rink et al., 2012). 
  
2.2. Contemporary Demographics 
Deliberate attempts to revamp the economy of Merseyside in the last decade, coupled with more 
in-migration and wider economic growth have resulted in a slight growth in population more 
recently (+1.8%, 2004 - 2014). There are currently approximately 1.39 million people living in 
Merseyside (ONS, 2015). Virtually all its residents (99%) live in urban communities which contrasts 
with roughly 4 out of 5 (82%) residents in England as a whole. Figure 2.6 shows the population 
spread across the five Local Authorities within the region. Together, Liverpool accounts for more 
than a third of the entire population, Wirral almost a quarter and Sefton a fifth with only just over 
1 in 10 Merseyside residents based in St Helens and a similar proportion in Knowsley. Figures are 
based on the 2014 Office for National Statistics mid-year population estimates. 
 
Figure 2.6: Merseyside Population Shares by Local Authorities (2014) 
 
Data Source: ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates  
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Figure 2.7: Merseyside Percentage Population Change (2010 - 2014) 
 
Data Source: ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates  
 
In terms of population change, the region witnessed a growth of 1.1% (15,200 people) between 2010 
and 2014. The strongest growth has occurred in Liverpool with a 2.5% increase (11,700 people), 
followed by a 1.1% (2,000 people) increase in St. Helens. Wirral witnessed a rise of 0.6% (1,800 
people). Population has remained relatively stagnant in Knowsley while Sefton experienced a 
slight fall of 0.1% (300 people). Overall Merseyside’s population increase has been small when 
compared with the national figure (3.2%).  
 
Figure 2.8 provides a visual representation of population change at Lower Super Output Area 
(LSOA).1 More than half of the LSOAs in Wirral (56%) and Liverpool (51%) experienced growth, 
whilst in St. Helens, 47% of LSOAs saw a rise in population. In Sefton and Knowsley, 42% of LSOAs 
saw a rise in population. The 15 LSOAs with the highest percentage increases in population, ranging 
from 26.6% to 154.3% were all in Liverpool. However, 9 of the 15 LSOAs with the largest percentage 
population falls were also in Liverpool.   
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Super Output Areas are a geography for the collection and publication of small area statistics. They are used 
on the Neighbourhood Statistics site and across National Statistics. There are currently two layers of SOA, 
Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) and Middle Layer Super Output Area (MSOA). The SOA layers form 
a hierarchy based on aggregations of Output Areas (OAs). Lower Layer SOAs were first built using 2001 
Census data from groups of Output Areas (typically four to six) and have been updated following the 2011 
Census. They have an average of roughly 1,500 residents and 650 households. Measures of proximity (to give 
a reasonably compact shape) and social homogeneity (to encourage areas of similar social background) are 
also included. 
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Figure 2.8: Merseyside Population Change at Lower Super Output Area Scale (2010 - 2014) 
 
Notes: Boundaries downloaded from the UK Data Service. Contains Ordnance Survey data Crown copyright and 
database right 2015. Population data from ONS Small Area Population Estimates. 
 
Male Population Change 
The pattern of change in Merseyside’s male population is largely similar to that of the total 
population. However, increases in numbers of males have been slightly higher than the total 
figures for nearly all parts of Merseyside. There was a greater rise amongst males compared to 
females. Figure 2.9 shows that the strongest growth has occurred in Liverpool (2.8%). Merseyside’s 
overall increase remains small when compared to the national figure of 3.5%. 
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Figure 2.9: Merseyside Percentage Male Population Change (2010 - 2014) 
 
Data Source: ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates  
 
Significant Fall Amongst 10 to 20 Year olds 
Whilst there were rises amongst males and the entire population, there was a significant fall 
amongst the 10 to 20 year old cohort. This trend is also apparent nationally. However, the fall 
amongst this age bracket is 6 percentage points greater than that of England. 
 
Age Structure  
Figure 2.10 presents Merseyside’s 2014 population in ‘pyramid’ form. Some of Merseyside’s largest 
population groups are males in the 20-24 and 25-29 age brackets and females in the 20-24 and 50-
54 age brackets. The 15-19 age group is inflated somewhat by student numbers, with net internal 
migration data for Merseyside showing a net gain of 1,427 persons in the 15-19 age group for 2013-
2014.  
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Figure 2.10: Merseyside’s Population Pyramid by Age Bands (2014) 
 
Data Source: ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates  
 
Long-term International Migration 
Population change is also impacted by long-term international migration. Figure 2.11 shows that 
amongst the five Local Authorities within Merseyside, international migration has recently been 
highest in Liverpool. Liverpool exhibits a net inflow of 0.54% of the city’s population. Figures for 
the other Local Authorities are lower or negative. Merseyside’s overall net inflow is 0.18%, 
compared with a national figure of 0.45%. 
 
Figure 2.11: Long-term International Migration as % of Total Resident Population (2013 - 2014) 
 
Data Source: ONS  
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Population Forecast 
The ONS produced the latest available long-term population forecasts based on 2012 population 
data. The analysis forecasts how population will change between 2012 and 2037. Forecasts should 
always be treated with a degree of caution. The expectation for Merseyside is for low growth of 
just 4.2% compared with a 16.2% increase nationally. The strongest rates of growth are forecast for 
St. Helens (7.6%) and Liverpool (5.6%) with more modest growth anticipated in Wirral (3.4%), Sefton 
(2.2%) and Knowsley (1.2%).  
 
Focusing on the 10-19 age group, Figure 2.12 shows the expected numbers in this bracket. We 
believe this age group is a crucial cohort in terms of targeting early interventions. The 2012-2037 
population forecast for Merseyside suggest that numbers will initially fall to 150,000 in 2018 and 
2019, followed by a 10% rise up to 166,000 in 2030 and 2031 before declining to 163,000 in 2037.   
 
Figure 2.12: Population Forecasts for Merseyside Population Aged 10-19 (2012 - 2037) 
 
Data Source: ONS  
 
Ethnicity 
Around 95% of Merseyside’s residents define their ethnicity as ‘white’ compared with 85.4% 
nationally. Merseyside is noticeably less ethnically diverse than the national average. However, 
Liverpool is the most ethnically diverse amongst the five Local Authorities, with proportions of 
different ethnic groups that are more akin to the national picture.   
 
Looked After Children 
Virtually all children in care tend to come from backgrounds of deprivation, poor parenting, abuse 
and neglect – factors that together are risk factors for a range of emotional, social and behavioural 
difficulties, including antisocial and offending behaviour (Schofield et al., 2012).  
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Figure 2.13: Looked After Children by Local Authority (2011 - 2015) 
 
Data Source: Department for Education  
 
Merseyside has much higher rates of children who are looked after by the Local Authority 
compared with the national average. The region’s figure rose gradually from 92 to 102 per 10,000 
children between 2011 and 2015. Conversely, during the same period, the figure for England 
remained fairly stable rising from 58 to 60 per 10,000 children. Within Merseyside the highest rates 
of looked after children are found in St. Helens (113 per 10,000 children) and Liverpool (111 per 
10,000 children). All Merseyside authorities face the added challenge of having to look after 
children placed there from other parts of the country. 
 
2.3. Deprivation 
There is an inherent link between economic deprivation and crime. The Indices of Deprivation 
combine numerous dimensions of deprivation: Income; Employment; Education, Skills and Training 
Deprivation; Health Deprivation and Disability; Crime; Barriers to Housing and Services; and Living 
Environment Deprivation. A very high proportion of Merseyside LSOAs fall within the most 
deprived 10% of LSOAs in England as shown in Figure 2.14.  
 
Figure 2.14: Index of Multiple Deprivation (2015) 
 
Data Source: The Indices of Deprivation 2015 have been constructed for the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) by Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion (OCSI) 
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Overall, 31.8% of Merseyside’s LSOAs fall within this category with the highest proportions in 
Knowsley and Liverpool where nearly half of all LSOAs fall within the most deprived 10% nationally. 
St. Helens, Wirral and Sefton each have more than 20% of their LSOAs in the ‘most deprived 10%’ 
category. 
 
Figure 2.15 shows the geographic distribution of deprived areas in Merseyside. Spatial 
concentrations of high deprivation areas are evident in each of the Local Authorities. 
 
Figure 2.15: Deprivation in Merseyside (2015) 
 
Notes: Boundaries downloaded from the UK Data Service. Contains Ordnance Survey data Crown copyright and 
database right 2015. The Indices of Deprivation have been constructed for the Department of Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) by Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion (OCSI). 
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Worklessness 
Levels of deprivation can also be mirrored by statistics on workless households. Figure 2.16 shows 
the percentage of households that were workless in 2014. This analysis only includes households 
that have at least one person of working age and excludes all households that contain only 
students. Workless household rates provide an indication of a variety of deprivation aspects 
including employment, health, education and opportunity-related deprivation. All of Merseyside’s 
5 Local Authorities have above national shares of workless households, with the highest 
proportion found in Liverpool (29.6%) and the lowest in Sefton (19.2%). 
 
Figure 2.16: Percentage of Households that are Workless (2014) 
 
Data Source: ONS 
 
Unemployment and NEET  
Unemployment rates for persons of working age are high in Merseyside compared with England.  
Liverpool’s rate, at 10.7%, is nearly twice the national figure. Rates in St. Helens, Knowsley and 
Wirral exceed the national average.  However, Sefton’s unemployment rate is lower than national 
at 3.3%.   
 
The proportion of 16-18 year olds who are ‘not in employment, education or training’ (NEET) are 
an interesting group to examine given the relatively higher incidence of crime vulnerability 
amongst this cohort (LSN, 2009).  
 
Table 2.1: Share of 16-18 Year Olds who are ‘Not in Employment, Education or Training’ (NEET) (2014) 
Area 16-18 year olds NEET (%) 
Knowsley  8.0 
Liverpool  8.2 
Sefton  5.7 
St. Helens  6.6 
Wirral  4.3 
Merseyside 6.6 
North West 5.2 
England 4.7 
Data Source: Department for Education 
Note: In Liverpool LA the proportion of 16-18 year olds whose current activity is not known is 23.7% compared with the 
England average of 9.0%.  As a result, the number and proportion of NEETs in Liverpool may be inaccurate. 
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From Table 2.1, it is obvious that NEET rates in Merseyside are higher than the national figure. The 
highest NEET rates are in Liverpool (8.2%) and Knowsley (8.0%) while Wirral exhibits the lowest rate 
within Merseyside (4.3%). 
 
2.4. Criminogenics 
In 2014, Merseyside recorded 70 crimes per 1,000 head of population compared with a national 
rate of 61. Out of the 6 Police Forces, Merseyside exhibited the second highest rate of recorded 
crime behind Greater Manchester. However, rates were broadly similar for the regions shown in 
Table 2.2. Recorded crime rates in Northumbria during 2014 were significantly lower than the other 
regions. 
 
Table 2.2: Recorded Crime per 1,000 Head of Population in Police Force Areas, Major Urban Areas (2014) 
Police Force Areas Crimes per 1,000 people 
Greater Manchester 71.5 
Merseyside 70.2 
Northumbria 49.9 
South Yorkshire 69.1 
West Midlands 63 
West Yorkshire 68.1 
England & Wales 61.4 
Data Source: HMIC 
 
Figure 2.17: Crime Deprivation in Merseyside, Index of Multiple Deprivation (2015) 
 
Notes: Boundaries downloaded from the UK Data Service. Contains Ordnance Survey data Crown copyright and 
database right 2015. The Indices of Deprivation have been constructed for the Department of Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) by Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion (OCSI). Crime domain data are based on violence, 
burglary, theft and criminal damage data provided by the Association of Chief Police Officers via the Home Office for 
2013/2014. 
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The map in Figure 2.17 shows the spatial distribution of ‘crime deprivation’ across Merseyside using 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) data for 2015. Data are based on crime figures for violence, 
burglary, theft and criminal damage for 2013/14. They show relative crime deprivation levels within 
Lower-layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in England. Spatial concentrations of the worst areas for 
crime deprivation are particularly evident in north Liverpool and in parts of Sefton and Wirral. 
However, each of the Local Authorities contain some high incidence of crime deprivation.   
 
Relative to the rest of England, Merseyside has a slightly higher than average proportion of its 
LSOAs falling within England’s ‘most deprived 10% for crime’. Approximately 12% of Merseyside’s 
LSOAs fall within England’s most deprived 10% for crime. However, there is considerable variation 
across Merseyside. Liverpool is the worst performing with 23% of its LSOAs in this category, while 
Merseyside’s other 4 Local Authority each have less than 10%. In Knowsley just 3% of its LSOAs fall 
into this category while Sefton and Wirral each have 7%. St. Helens has 8% of LSOAs in the category. 
 
Figure 2.18: Crime Deprivation in Merseyside, Index of Multiple Deprivation (2015) 
 
 
A comparison of crime deprivation data from the 2010 IMD and the 2015 IMD, shows that the share 
of Merseyside’s LSOAs falling into the worst 10% nationally has increased from 8% to 12%. Ironically, 
during the same period, community safety funding for the region has diminished – a mismatch 
between needs and priorities. Figure 2.18 shows that four of the five Local Authorities have seen a 
larger proportion of their LSOAs fall into the ‘most crime deprived 10%’ over the 2010 – 2015 period. 
Only Knowsley remained unchanged. 
 
2.5. Crime Demographics 
In 2014, the Ministry of Justice released data showing persons found guilty or cautioned for 
indictable offences by individual age categories and gender. Rates for males within Merseyside are 
high between the ages 16 to 38 and highest between the ages 17 to 29. Nationally the male peak 
offending age range is 17-27.  
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Figure 2.19: Males Found Guilty or Cautioned for Indictable Offences in Merseyside (2014) 
 
Data Source: Ministry of Justice 
 
Figure 2.20: Females Found Guilty or Cautioned for Indictable Offences in Merseyside (2014) 
 
Data Source: Ministry of Justice 
 
The picture for females is generally different. For females, rates are high between ages 24 to 44, 
and highest between ages 32 to 39. Nationally however, the peak for females is between the ages 
24 to 32. After age 32, rates begin to decline nationally but they start to peak in Merseyside. 
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3. An Overview of Direct and Indirect Impacts of Austerity   
We now turn to the core purpose of this report which is to gauge the scale, dimensions and 
implications of austerity in terms of community safety within Merseyside. To do this we have 
primarily drawn on key stakeholders’ views and related academic and policy literature. We 
interviewed representatives of the main agencies operating in this policy sphere: 
 The Police and Crime Commissioner for Merseyside; 
 Merseyside Police; 
 Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service; 
 The five district authorities (Community Safety Partnership leads); 
 Liverpool Youth Offending Service; 
 Public Health Liverpool; and 
 A large Registered Social Landlord with pan-Merseyside stock – Riverside Housing2 
 
In total we spoke to 16 interviewees. Each stakeholder was asked to describe their community 
safety activities in 2010 and their impact; compare funding in 2010 with the current position; 
describe how funding changes have impacted upon their strategic approach and operations, staff 
morale, public confidence, engagement and perceptions of their activities; reflect on how their 
operational context and challenges have changed in the 2010-2015 period.  
 
We also asked them to forecast the scale of future funding cuts post-2015 until the end of the 
current parliament and the likely implications and ways of mitigating the impact of the cuts and to 
discuss the political, economic, social, technological, environmental, legislative and moral 
arguments for maintaining or increasing funding in these policy areas. These topics are covered in 
the next section.  
 
While it is relatively straightforward to measure the extent of funding cuts, many interviewees 
pointed out that gauging their impact is much more difficult for a number of reasons. As in many 
areas of public policy it is difficult to isolate the impact of funding cuts on community safety from 
a host of other factors such as societal trends, performance of service providers and so on. This 
policy sphere is a crowded arena as there are many agencies involved whose policies and 
programmes interact in a multitude of ways. Consequently, cuts have complex knock-on (indirect) 
effects in related service areas which are difficult to define, fully capture and measure accurately. 
This can lead to ‘cost shunting’ where the burden of responsibility shifts from one agency to 
another, placing yet more pressure on restricted budgets (House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee, 2015). Disentangling the effects of individual community safety, crime prevention and 
diversionary measures is also challenging, especially if they are running concurrently. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to demonstrate the effectiveness of different kinds of preventative measures because 
the lack of ‘policy off’ control areas makes it hard to establish what would have happened in their 
absence. The benefits of preventive measures may also take time to materialise. 
 
                                                          
2 We also approached Merseyside Probation Service, Merseyside Community Rehabilitation Company and 
Her Majesty’s Prison Service but it was not possible within the project’s tight timescale to arrange a 
mutually convenient time for the interview. 
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Similarly, there are time lags before changes in funding register an effect. Conceivably current 
public perceptions of public safety may partly be a legacy of initiatives introduced in the relatively 
benign pre-2010 funding environment.    
 
Finally, there is a dearth of intelligence on the impact of funding cuts, especially at grassroots level 
given the lack of formal monitoring and evaluation and in many agencies this problem has been 
compounded because cuts have resulted in the cessation of perception surveys and closure or 
downsizing of intelligence units. Also, assembling a comprehensive picture of changing community 
safety funding proved very difficult because it covers a number of different organisations and 
budget heads and data obtained varied in its level of detail, composition and quality. 
 
Attempts to gauge the impact of services on community safety and incidence of crime must also 
take into account that the current context is very different to what it was in 2010. New legislation 
has been introduced changing agencies’ respective roles and responsibilities. Some community 
safety issues are less of a challenge than they were then, while others are more so as new forms 
of criminal activity such as cybercrime have emerged.   
 
Prior to 2010 there was ample funding for community safety, crime prevention and diversionary 
services within Merseyside. The then Labour Government made it obligatory for public sector 
organisations to collaborate in the reduction of crime through participation in community safety 
partnerships and this was reflected in a host of related targets and funding streams. Attainment 
of targets in some cases triggered further ‘reward’ funding. This helped promote a holistic, joined-
up approach and spawned packages of complementary initiatives ranging from target hardening 
to diversionary activities and preventative measures. In addition, special funding (e.g. 
Neighbourhood Renewal Funds and Area Based Initiatives) could be tapped in order to improve 
socio-economic conditions in deprived areas which often experienced the highest incidence of 
crime and anti-social behaviour. Owing to the extent of Merseyside’s challenges and past incidents 
of unrest, public agencies received relatively generous funding settlements and the fact that the 
city region had its own dedicated Government Office gave it a voice in Whitehall.  
 
The position in 2015 is much different to what it was in 2010. Table 3.1 shows that most stakeholder 
bodies have experienced significant spending cutbacks, though their extent significantly varied.  
Likewise staffing levels have fallen dramatically by between 15% and 80%. While bodies have 
continued to deliver core, mandatory services, cuts have meant that partners have had to pare 
back non-statutory services and responses. This is a particular issue for Crime and Disorder 
Partnerships since a lot of the services they provide are non-statutory – for example, Multi-Agency 
Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs). All stakeholder organisations have had to carefully 
consider the business case for different lines of expenditure and prioritise accordingly and target 
resources on addressing the most salient issues and problems. Generally, agencies have moved 
away from seeking to provide services on a universal basis and towards adopting a risk-based 
approach. They are also designing briefer intervention models (for example, with domestic 
violence victims) which make the most of limited resources. 
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On a more positive note, acute funding pressures have underlined the need for community safety 
organisations to maintain a partnership philosophy and work together even more closely in order 
to dovetail approaches, avoid duplication and make the most of limited resources available. 
 
Government legislation, principally the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, has 
urged organisations to place vulnerable people and communities at the heart of everything they 
do. This has prompted an intelligence-led approach in the case of Merseyside Fire and Rescue 
Service in which they look to intervene much earlier to prevent escalation and reduce demand on 
other services. 
 
Table 3.1: Impact of Austerity on Community Safety Organisations 
Agency Change in funding 2010-2015 
(%) 
Change in staffing levels (%) 
2010-2015 (%) 
Merseyside Police -15 -20 
Merseyside Fire & Rescue Service -12 -31 
Public Health, Liverpool   n/a n/a 
Liverpool Youth Offending Service -48  -62 
Liverpool Council (Safer Communities) -78 -90 (estimate) 
Wirral Council (Safer Communities) -0.6 -50 
St Helens Council (Safer Communities) -26  -66 (estimate) 
Sefton Council (Safer Communities) -70 (estimate -70 (estimate) 
Knowsley Council (Safer Communities) -80 (estimate) -80 (estimate) 
Riverside Housing -  RSLs -25 (estimate) n/a 
Source: Survey of community safety organisation 
Note: CSP figures vary considerably because some included cuts in the number of Neighbourhood wardens as well as 
core staff and also because they were in some cases ball park estimates 
 
More detailed budgetary information supplied by the Wirral Community Safety team has shown 
that cuts have fallen unevenly, depending on the type of community safety service provided (Table 
3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 Community Safety Funding Changes in the Wirral 
 
2010 (£m) 
(£m) 
2015 (£m) % change 2010 - 2015 
Domestic violence victims services 0.236 0.227 -3.8 
Offender services 0.558 0.599 7.3 
Housing support for young people at risk 2.545 2.126 -16.5 
Youth diversionary services (Sport Development 
Unit) 
0.378 0.055 -85.4 
Community safety partnership funding (including 
Local Area 
Agreement grant  
Agreement grant  
1.102 1.097 -0.5 
 
Many organisations are finding that resources for certain kinds of preventative measures, 
especially diversionary activities are no longer available which is making such legislative demands 
hard to fulfil. Most stakeholders felt that the lack of such services will rebound because it will lead 
to growing demands and pressures upon the criminal justice system. As already noted, local 
authorities have also had to cut back intelligence units which in the past have highlighted 
community safety needs in specific areas.   
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One stakeholder pointed out that the funding to the key community safety stakeholders covered 
in this report does not represent the whole picture. Significant funds relating to community safety 
are distributed directly to individual Merseyside organisations rather than via Community Safety 
Partnerships or local authorities. This potentially militates against achieving a strategic approach 
and can lead to duplication, and the risk that money goes to those who shout loudest rather than 
where it is most needed or effective.   
 
3.1. Impacts of Austerity on Service Provision 
Most stakeholders found it very hard to separate out their activities into the three main areas of 
concern to this study: community safety, crime prevention and diversionary services. We have 
therefore opted to report the impact of austerity primarily on the main service providers before 
concluding with a brief illustrative look at the indirect effects of cuts to one organisation on others 
working in the community safety sphere.   
 
Merseyside Police  
In 2010, Merseyside Police played a prominent part in multi-agency Crime and Disorder 
Partnerships (later Community Safety Partnerships) within each district – indeed many were 
chaired or deputy chaired by the relevant District Commander. These sought to ensure partners 
adopted a holistic response to each authorities’ community safety issues. The lion’s share of 
resources was invested in crime prevention initiatives focussed around target hardening such as 
alley-gating, smartwater and security lighting. However, significant resources were injected into 
diversionary services such as youth engagement programmes, in the hope those would lead to 
reductions in burglary, robbery, car crime and anti-social behaviour and also Domestic Violence 
Advocates.   
 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that Police budget has fallen by nearly 15% in the 2010-2015 period and that 
staffing levels have fallen by around 20% during that time. The reduction in the number of Police 
Community Support Officers (PCSOs) during that time has been of similar magnitude. In total the 
Force has lost about £81m in funding compared with what it would have received had 2010 levels 
of spending continued. This has impinged on all of its services but especially neighbourhood 
resources and policing which have been cut by 40%. Rationalisation has resulted in the closure of 
22 general enquiry offices and 2 custody suites. The cuts have prompted the Police to: 
 streamline performance management arrangements; 
 focus attention on delivering core priorities of reducing crime and anti-social behaviour, 
maintaining public safety, providing neighbourhood policing; 
 focus on the most serious, persistent community safety problems using incidence of crime data 
rather than responding to temporary upturns and cyclical patterns;  
 allocate resources on a threat, harm and risk basis – for example by deploying PCSOs more in 
crime prone than in affluent areas;  
 introduce efficiency savings by conducting an estates review, opening a new joint command 
centre with MRFS, investing in IT for frontline officers, improving procurement; and  
 conduct multi-pronged operations in areas with a high incidence of crime (e.g. Evaluation of 
Operation Aquilla in Anfield revealed that it had reduced business robbery by 60% over a six 
month period through a combination of target hardening (cloaks, DNA sprays and a marketing 
campaign). 
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Table 3.3: Merseyside Police: Budget  
2010 2015 % change 2010 - 2015 
Budget £366m £313m -14.5 
 
Table 3.4: Merseyside Police: Change in Staffing 2010-2015  
2010 2015 % change 2010 - 2015 
Police officers 4562 3706 -18.8 
Staff 2287 1769 -22.6 
Community support officers 466 361 -22.5 
Total  7315 5836 -20.2 
Specials 547 (Dec 2011)* 352 (December 2015) -35.6 
Source: HMIC, 2014 
 
Merseyside Police has sustained deeper cuts to their workforce than forces as a whole in England 
and Wales in the 2010-15 period though some other metropolitan forces have been even harder hit 
(Figure 3.1). However, only Northumbria has seen a greater percentage reduction in its numbers 
of PCSOs during that time (Figure 3.2)  
Figure 3.1: Percentage Change in Total Workforce (FTEs) 2010-20151
 
Source: HMIC 
Note: 2010-2014 data are actual while 2015 data are projected 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4.1
-8.4
-11.2
-12.9
-15.9 -16.3
-18
-19.9
-23.7
-14.1
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
S
o
u
th
 W
al
e
s
A
vo
n
 &
 S
o
m
e
rs
e
t
N
o
tt
in
g
h
am
sh
ir
e
G
re
at
e
r 
M
an
ch
e
st
e
r
M
e
rs
e
ys
id
e
W
e
st
 M
id
la
n
d
s
S
o
u
th
 Y
o
rk
sh
ir
e
W
e
st
 Y
o
rk
sh
ir
e
N
o
rt
h
u
m
b
ri
a
A
ll 
Fo
rc
e
s
%
Implications for Austerity for Community Safety within Merseyside 
28 
 
Office of Police and Crime Commissioner 
Since the office was established in late 2012/early 2013, it has cut its annual costs dramatically from 
£2.4m to £1.3m and by restructuring it has reduced its staff complement from 29 to 20 people. This 
has resulted in savings of about £2.5m over the period 2013–2015. The Office has sought to 
maximise available resources by conducting research to determine how best to target funding 
(e.g. commissioning victim services) and bringing local authorities, voluntary bodies and other 
partners together to deliver some services on a consistent pan-Merseyside basis thereby freeing 
up resources for other purposes, notably in the areas of domestic violence advocacy, rape and 
sexual assault referral and third party reporting of hate crime.  
 
Figure 3.2: Percentage Change in Police Community Support Officers (FTEs) 2010-20151 
 
Source: HMIC 
Note: 2010-2014 data are actual while 2015 data are projected 
 
Local Authorities   
Austerity has had a harsh impact upon the five district authorities leading their respective 
Community Safety Partnerships. They utilise a cocktail of funding for community safety purposes 
and without exception all their funding streams have been cut back dramatically. Table 3.6 for 
example shows the extent of cut backs in community safety funding and also City Watch (CCTV) 
operations in Liverpool in the 2010-15 period. This picture has been replicated in the other 
Merseyside authorities.    
 
Table 3.6: Liverpool City Council: Funding for Community Safety Activities  
Funding 2010/2011 Funding 2015/2016 % change  
Community safety function/service 9.506m 2.102m -78 
City Watch Operations 6.372m 3.025m -53 
Note: The Community safety function figure comprises a variety of funds/grants.  Community safety and City Watch 
Operations figures in each case include: income, grants, contributions, charges for services, internal recharges.    
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Local authorities also receive more modest amounts of Community Safety Funding from The Police 
and Crime Commissioner for crime reduction and community safety initiatives. Such funding has 
fallen by about 10% overall in the 2010-2015 period to around £2.87m (Table 3.5). In the past, local 
authorities have largely been granted discretion to spend their Community Safety Fund (CSF) 
allocations as they see fit given local needs. For example, some spend more on initiatives, others 
more on staffing. Cuts have therefore impacted CSF funded activities in varying ways in the 
different district authorities. The Commissioner has drawn upon reserves in order to maintain 
Community Safety Fund support at broadly the same level - otherwise the cuts would have been 
worse still. However, cuts in other kinds of funding have impacted upon local authorities and their 
Community Safety Partnership partners.    
 
Accurately gauging the extent of CSF cuts has proved difficult because in March 2013, the Home 
Office consolidated a number of funding streams3 which had previously been allocated to Local 
Authorities into a single funding pot, the Community Safety Fund, and made the Police and Crime 
Commissioner responsible for its allocation. It has not proved possible to assemble comprehensive 
information on each funding source.     
 
Table 3.5: Community Safety Fund Allocations to Merseyside District Authorities: 2015/2016 
Merseyside District Authorities 2015/2016 
Merseyside Police 0.746 
Wirral MBC 0.388 
Liverpool CC 0.962 
St Helens MBC 0.197 
Sefton MBC 0.374 
Knowsley MBC  0.204 
Total  2.871 
Source: Merseyside Police and Crime Commissioner, 2015.   
NB. Figures include Youth Offending Service and Drug and Alcohol Team (DAAT) funding but exclude allocations to 
Positive Futures which were £0.094m in 2015/2016.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 These funding streams included: Drug Interventions Programme (DIP); DIP Drug Testing Grant; Community Safety 
Partnership Funding; Youth Crime and Substance Misuse Prevention activities; Positive Futures; Communities against 
Gangs, Guns and Knives; Ending Gang and Youth Violence programme; Community Action Against Crime: Innovation 
Fund; Safer Future Communities. 
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Viewed collectively the cuts have impacted more on some activities than others because of the 
combined effect of cuts in different grant sources and other pressures on income. Local authorities 
and their partners in the Community Safety Partnerships have, however, been affected in some 
common ways: 
 There has been a dramatic cut in the number of partnership posts and secondments by the 
main community safety organisations as their budgets have come under pressure and they 
have found it difficult to maintain non-core services. 
 Anti-social behaviour teams have been disbanded, scaled back or subsumed within other 
departments – cutbacks have been especially marked in Merseyside Police, for example. 
 There is less resource to pay for specialists in particular forms of crime or community safety 
issues.  
 Councils have had to become more selective with legal interventions, though this is also due 
to new legislation concerning anti-social behaviour which has meant that enforcement leads 
to civil actions where the onus is placed on the party bringing the case to enforce it. 
 Intelligence units which used to organise community safety surveys for example have been 
disbanded or significantly cut which has meant that agencies have had to rely more on soft 
intelligence. 
 Resources for target hardening such as alleygating and CCTV are much less now than in 2010. 
 Youth diversionary projects have been markedly scaled back because of cuts in CSF and also 
cuts to Youth Offending Teams.    
 Service provision has tended to shift from seeking broad coverage to a much more targeted, 
needs led, risk-based approach.    
 
Table 3.5: Community Safety Fund Allocations to Merseyside District Authorities: 2015/2016  
2015/2016 
Merseyside Police 0.746 
Wirral MBC 0.388 
Liverpool CC 0.962 
St Helens MBC 0.197 
Sefton MBC 0.374 
Knowsley MBC  0.204 
Total  2.871 
Source: Merseyside Police and Crime Commissioner, 2015.   
NB. Figures include Youth Offending Service and Drug and Alcohol Team (DAAT) funding but exclude allocations to 
Positive Futures which were £0.094m in 2015/2016.   
 
Interviewees from local authorities were especially concerned at the way in which the cuts have 
limited their ability to respond to community safety issues such as anti-social behaviour and forms 
of crime which are on the increase, notably domestic violence. 
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Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service 
Introduction of Crime and Disorder Partnerships in 1998 encouraged MFRS to work with others in 
taking a holistic view of community safety and as a result of the 2004 Fire and Rescue Services Act, 
community safety and fire prevention became a central part of the Fire and Rescue service’s modus 
operandi. This encouraged a lot of innovation and thinking outside the box such as working with 
prison offenders to reduce the future likelihood of anti-social behaviour, promoting safe cooking, 
hosting obesity clinics at fire stations, youth engagement work, appointing school fire liaison 
officers to raise young people’s awareness of fire hazards in the home. MFRS activities in recent 
years have been organised around its four strategic aims: operational preparedness, operational 
response, prevention and protection and developing and valuing its staff.  
 
Since 80% of MFRS’s budget comprises staff costs, reductions in government grant (typically 
around 60% of its budget) of about 35% in the period 2010-2015 (Table 3.7) have inevitably led to 
staff losses. However, the service has worked hard to minimise these through efficiency savings to 
just over 30% (Table 3.8). The number of frontline fire appliances has also fallen by a similar degree 
(33%).    
 
Table 3.7: Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service: Budget and Government Grant  
2010 2015 % change 2010-
2015 Budget £73.3m £64.4m -12.1 
Government Grant £49.9m £37.0m -25.9 
 
Table 3.8: Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service: Change in Staffing and Equipment Levels 2010-2015  
2010 2015 % change 2010-
2015 Fire fighters 980 676 -31.0 
Community safety advocates 48 36 -25.0 
Total staff 1028 712 -30.7 
School fire liaison officers (included in above) 20 2 -90.0 
Prince Trust programme participants c.60 c.36 c.-40 
Fire engines 42 28 -33.3 
 
Although MFRS remains committed to preventative measures, emphasis on protecting frontline 
services has meant that cuts have impacted more on support services. By maintaining ten key 
stations which can reach anywhere in the county in ten minutes, the service has ensured that 
response times of first on the scene emergency vehicles remain good – the average is a respectable 
5.2 minutes. However, the reduced number of vehicles and pumps has meant that the response 
time of the second engines is now over 8 minutes, 2 minutes slower than it was in 2010. Cuts have 
led to a significant reduction in diversionary services. Whereas Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service 
delivered about 100,000 home safety checks (its flagship community engagement programme) 
each year before 2010, now the figure is more like 40,000. These are targeted at the most 
vulnerable and those in greatest risk. Mentoring of young people on issues of anti-social behaviour 
and home safety was originally delivered by 20 school fire liaison officers but since only 2 remain 
this work is now on a much smaller scale. Also, Princes Trust programmes have been scaled back 
by about a 40%.   
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MFRS used to work with businesses to facilitate recovery after a fire but in the light of cutbacks it 
is no longer involved in such work. Also, it no longer has the funds to commission evaluations to 
prove whether its interventions have proved effective.  
 
MFRS has sought to mitigate the impact of cuts by targeting its services on those at greatest risk, 
improving data sharing with other partners such as the NHS, investigating the scope for co-
creation with local authorities in the employment of healthy home advocates, changing shift 
patterns so as to balance more day and night time shifts and also putting advocates on flexible 
contracts to improve productivity. 
 
Social Housing 
Registered Social Landlords are committed to tackling anti-social behaviour because it adds to 
maintenance costs, problems with voids and reduces the popularity of their properties. Direct 
measures range from injunctions, anti-social behaviour and criminal anti-social behaviour orders to 
eviction orders though the latter are only used as a last resort. RSLs also work with a variety of 
partners in supporting a wide range of youth development and diversionary activities, cultural 
integration, elderly, victim support and community engagement projects. Given that we 
interviewed only one major Registered Social Landlord it is not possible to specify the precise 
impact of cuts on all the preventative services supplied by RSLs on Merseyside. However, if one 
assumes that other housing associations have responded to austerity in broadly similar fashion to 
Riverside Housing, their collective spending on anti-social behaviour initiatives has fallen by about 
approximately £250k a year or £1.25m over the 2010-2015 period. RSLs remain committed to anti-
social behaviour initiatives even in a harsh spending climate for commercial reasons but they have 
had to resort to rigorously testing the business case for each project.   
 
The interviewee from Riverside Housing also offered an insight into the cost-shunting 
phenomenon. He estimated that the cuts in resources sustained by the police, fire service and local 
authorities effectively meant that Riverside’s resources have had to be spread over a wider range 
of activities resulting in an effective 25% cut in its resources. RSLs have tried to offset the impact of 
cuts by thoroughly vetting prospective tenants, allocating properties carefully and tackling 
problems more intelligently through improved data sharing and joint working with partners.   
 
Public Health 
The impact of austerity on public health in the period 2010-2015 is difficult to gauge. The main 
development in this sphere has been the 2012 Health and Social Care Act which resulted in the 
transfer of responsibility for public health matters from the NHS to local authorities. The Act has 
come into force in the last two years. While cuts of around £2.8m are only taking effect this year, 
there is great concern that responsibility for a range of services with a community safety angle to 
them such as alcohol services and rehabilitation services for substance misusers, domestic 
violence, preventative services and health visiting is being transferred without sufficient funding.  
 
Also, there appears to be no funding to cater for the increase in the incidence of certain problems 
such as domestic violence. There is talk of the need for more preventative action to avoid the need 
for NHS treatment but it remains unclear how such services are to be funded.   
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Youth Offending Service 
The Youth Offending Services in Merseyside gave us an indication of how austerity is impacting on 
preventive work with schools and individual young people. Grants from both central government 
via the Youth Justice Board and the local authorities have been cut significantly, resulting in a major 
scaling back in the size of the service. The service has been faced with the twin pressures of coping 
with the cuts and dealing with a much more complex and entrenched cohort of young people who 
offend. On the other hand, the merger of the Youth Offending Service and the Youth Service within 
the district authorities has resulted in new ways of working and a more integrated service for 
young people.  
 
It is worth noting that the above analysis underrepresents the overall impact of austerity because 
we have not investigated the impact of spending cuts on community and voluntary sector 
organisations which are active in the community safety sphere and a support to other 
organisations covered in this report. Central and local government grants to such organisations 
have been cut back in many cases during that time. This is having particularly serious implications 
where the incidence of specific types of crime are on the increase such as domestic violence 
(McRobie, 2013).  
 
Indirect Impacts 
Organisations have not just had to cope with cuts to their own budgets. They have also had to deal 
with the consequences of cuts in other bodies. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to identify 
every type of indirect impact, the following examples give an indication of how cuts in a series of 
Liverpool City Council departments have had knock-on effects upon their partner bodies and wider 
community safety implications: 
 The city council’s ASB Unit which once comprised a large team with legal staff and police 
officers now has just 4 officers, dramatically limiting its scope.  
 Loss of City Watch wardens and environmental enforcement staff and City Centre goldzone 
policing funded by the council has reduced scope to nip problems in the bud at the grassroots 
level. 
 There is less community engagement activity – particularly through Neighbourhood Services 
and a Community Cohesion team. 
 Loss of Citysafe Grant has resulted in fewer community safety projects. 
 Marketing cuts have meant fewer communication campaigns and less community 
consultation. 
 Corporate Grant Fund – cuts to this fund have impacted on victim services. 
 Funding reductions have resulted in the closure of community facilities or reduced opening 
hours. 
 Cuts to Youth services have led to a reduction in diversionary activities and outreach services. 
 Cuts to Trading Standards have lessened the ability to tackle fraud against vulnerable people 
and led to a scaling back of alcohol-related initiatives. 
 
 
 
Implications for Austerity for Community Safety within Merseyside 
34 
 
3.2. Impacts of Austerity on Public Perceptions of, Confidence in, Services 
Most stakeholders felt that public confidence in service providers has not so far been dented by 
austerity. Some felt that this was a consequence of steady falls in many types of crime over the last 
decade, though some did wonder if the recent upturn could in time result in a change in attitudes.   
Others felt that public confidence was a legacy of goodwill generated pre-2010 because of the 
fruits of partnership working between agencies on community safety issues. Yet others thought 
many members of the public made allowances for what service providers can deliver given 
spending reductions. Some pointed out that prominent local politicians and officials have 
contributed to this perception by highlighting the serious implications of the cuts for service 
delivery.    
 
Many stakeholders added the rider that their answers were based on soft, anecdotal evidence and 
guesswork by colleagues working in the same arena rather than hard intelligence now that 
community perception surveys of crime and community safety services are no longer conducted 
by community safety partnerships. Public confidence in the police and emergency services is now 
only measured at a generalised level in the British Crime Survey. Stakeholders therefore conceded 
that the story on the ground may be rather different from what they perceive it to be.    
 
Public confidence is closely associated with the performance of service providers. Available data 
suggests that the performance of the emergency services is holding up well and that it has not so 
far been adversely affected by the cuts in the 2010-2015 period. Indeed, in the 2010-2014 period, the 
percentage of Merseyside Police emergency and priority calls on target (under 10 minutes and 
under an hour, respectively) went up, significantly in the case of the latter, from 77-92% (HMIC, 
2014). Police victim satisfaction levels remain high and better on Merseyside than in England and 
Wales as a whole. As already noted, MFRS’s first vehicle response times remain good and compare 
favourably with most services in England and Wales. The police did indicate that some members of 
the public see attendance at the scene of the crime rather than dealing with it over the telephone 
as an indication of the seriousness with which they are treating the case. This has proved 
increasingly difficult to achieve given pressures on budgets. However, the police have not detected 
any fall off in crime reporting because of reductions in confidence.  
 
Research has shown that public confidence in the police is also linked to their visibility – for 
example, neighbourhood patrols, response to 999 calls and serious traffic collisions (ONS, 2014). 
Allocation of police officers and PCSOs to visible roles is better in Merseyside than the average for 
England and Wales in the former case and on a par in the case of the latter, despite a fall in the 
percentage of about 5% since 2010 (HMIC,2014). Deployment of specials and prioritisation of 
frontline policing has meant that the proportion of police officers on the frontline on Merseyside 
has increased slightly from 89% to 91% from 2010-15, despite overall staff cuts.    
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Crime trends reveal a more complex picture.  Most categories of recorded crime continued to fall 
in the period 2010-2013 in line with longer term trends, save for fraud. Incidence of anti-social 
behaviour has fallen considerably since the mid-2000s which has probably bolstered community 
satisfaction and confidence with service providers in the community safety sphere. Since 2013, 
however, ONS data has shown that there has been a slight upturn in recorded crime on Merseyside 
with significant rises (of more than 10%) in the incidence of violence against the person, shoplifting 
and sexual offences. Incidence of all types of recorded crime on Merseyside in 2014 had returned 
to levels found in 2011. This is unlike England and Wales where recorded crime has fallen during the 
2011-2014 period and other metropolitan regions where the recent upturn has been less marked 
except in the case of South Wales (Figure 3.3). It is not yet clear, however, to what extent the 
recent upturn is due to cuts or economic factors, new types of criminal activity and changes in 
recording methods.  It is the case that the 2014 HMIC inspection of crime data found significant 
under-reporting of violence against the person and sexual offences which has led to a significant 
increase in reported crime in these categories (HMIC, 2014). If such trends persist, whatever the 
precise causes, they could begin to affect confidence in the Police and other service providers.    
 
Stakeholders reported there is an understanding and acceptance, even sympathy amongst the 
general public that most agencies are doing the best they can with increasingly limited resources. 
This especially applies to those that are well regarded for the services they provide. That said, some 
stakeholders thought that the public do not always appreciate the full implications of spending 
cuts and that it is only when things go wrong and appropriate support is not forthcoming that the 
penny drops. There have been local complaints, for example, when CCTV cameras have been 
removed in parts of Knowsley and when youth diversionary and other services have been cut back 
in Liverpool. Some stakeholders were concerned that the move to more general rather than 
specialised support in some areas because of staff cuts might in time damage public confidence. 
   
Some agencies have devoted additional time and effort to engaging the public in difficult decisions 
about rationalisation of services. For example, Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service have closely 
involved local communities in consultation exercises concerning the possible closure and merger 
of fire stations. Merseyside Police have sought to communicate to the general public that non-
attendance at small scale incidents such as retail thefts and vehicle damage does not signify that 
they are not taking such matters seriously and recording such crimes. Evidence suggests that if 
emergency response times are good, then public confidence is maintained. That said, the Police 
know that street presence does provide public reassurance and are very concerned that reductions 
in funding and manpower could detrimentally affect public confidence especially given current 
concerns that forthcoming cuts could result in the loss of their Police Community Support Officers.  
It is widely acknowledged that PCSOs help to reassure the public and nip localised anti-social 
behaviour in the bud.  
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3.3. Impacts of Austerity upon Staff 
Austerity has had a largely detrimental effect upon the morale of staff working in the sphere of 
community safety, crime prevention and diversionary services. That said, there is a lot of variation 
within the sector. Some service organisations have had to endure more draconian cuts than others 
– most local authorities have been particularly badly hit. Some staff have more favourable terms 
and conditions than others. For example, uniformed police cannot be made compulsorily 
redundant unlike their non-uniformed counterparts which has meant that morale amongst the 
former has tended to hold up much better than in the latter. The way in which funding cuts have 
impacted on staff working conditions and prospects has also had a crucial bearing on morale. We 
found that organisational culture and the political standpoint of individual employees have also 
affected staff morale. 
 
Figure 3.3: Total Recorded Crime per 1,000 Head of Population in Police Force Areas Covering 
Major Urban Areas (2011-14) 
 
Source: HMIC 
 
Persistent spending cuts have had a range of effects upon staff. Cuts have led to restructuring, 
mergers, voluntary or compulsory redundancies, redeployment, changes to working hours, 
additional responsibilities and workload. This has in turn affected job satisfaction and caused 
uncertainty, worry, additional stress, sickness and loss of expertise.   
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Reorganisation has also resulted in the need to forge new working relationships. While the vast 
majority of staff remain dedicated to their task, some - particularly those delivering the more 
vulnerable non-statutory preventative services - are beginning to wonder if they will be able to 
address effectively the extent of demand and needs of the general population if services are cut 
any further. One interviewee put it succinctly – ‘we are beginning to ask ourselves “what’s the 
point?”’ This feeling is reinforced when staff see their sister organisations also having to cut back 
which leaves the vulnerable even more exposed. Hence frustration with the limited scope for 
action is a very real issue which could tip into disillusionment if cuts persist which seems likely. The 
prospect of further cuts is a general dampener on morale because staff do not see any light at the 
end of the tunnel.    
 
Detailed analysis of feedback from stakeholders based within Public Health Liverpool also revealed 
that legislative changes have also affected morale within the sector. The transfer of public health 
responsibilities from the NHS to local authorities though in many respects logical has affected staff 
morale. The change has caused disruption and resulted in the loss of staff and expertise through 
retirement or switching to other careers. Staff felt that the focus has been on getting internal 
structures right and clarifying division of responsibilities at the expense of service users such as 
those at risk of substance and alcohol abuse.   
 
On a more positive note, both staff and host organisations are adopting various coping strategies.    
Year on year cuts have bred such widespread ‘austerity fatigue’ that many staff are adopting a 
stoical philosophy of making the best of a difficult situation and seeking to adapt to a more austere 
spending climate. News and updates are issued by senior management on a ‘need to know’ basis 
to enable staff to get on with the job. Generally, those organisations which have sought to adjust 
working cultures, innovate and adapt and maintain a good reputation with service users have 
ameliorated the negative effects of austerity on staff morale to a greater extent than those which 
have not done so. There have been instances where cuts have led to considerable organisational 
disruption and poor morale in their immediate aftermath but where the consequent restructuring 
has led to efficiencies and new ways of working in the longer term. 
 
Austerity has also prompted community safety organisations to scrutinise closely their staff’s use 
of time. For example, police officers traditionally had to spend inordinate time with those suffering 
from mental illness who were reported for threatening behaviour. Police discussions with mental 
health trusts resulted in the latter allocating staff to provide a joint response, which in turn avoided 
the need for officers to spend many hours in accident and emergency departments accompanying 
such people.      
 
The way organisations respond can also either build or detract from resilience. Esprit de corps tends 
to have been maintained where senior management has adopted a positive, encouraging attitude 
and kept staff in the picture when required and all tiers of staff have taken on additional workload 
to compensate for reductions in staffing. 
 
 
 
Implications for Austerity for Community Safety within Merseyside 
38 
 
4. A Forecast of the Depth, Breadth and Implications of Future Budget Cuts 
The key community safety stakeholders within Merseyside have now endured half a decade of 
budget cuts. During this period, they have had to endure deep reductions ranging from 12% to 80% 
of their funding. Having already delivered a huge amount of savings between 2010 and 2015, the 
organisations are confronted by the herculean task of delivering even deeper cuts over the next 
five years. The implementation of the first phase of funding cuts under the immediate past 
parliament has already had serious ramifications for services captured in the third chapter of this 
report. As a result of planned future budget cuts, it is unlikely that Merseyside’s community safety 
stakeholders will have sufficient funds to maintain the necessary range of services to provide the 
same level of community safety delivered prior to the introduction of austerity measures. 
Merseyside’s Community Safety stakeholders will find especially difficult deciding which non-
statutory services and responses to retain.   
 
At the time of drafting this report, a joint Spending Review and Autumn Statement was being 
planned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and scheduled for delivery on 25th November 2015. 
However, it is widely believed that five Whitehall departments would have to bear the brunt of 
significant deeper cuts which could translate to around 30% their funding (Elliott, 2015). The five 
Whitehall departments include: 
 The Police; 
 Local Government; 
 Courts; 
 Education; and 
 Business. 
 
At least three of these departments (The Police, Local Government and Courts) subsume partner 
organisations that deliver community safety services and initiatives within Merseyside. The 
expectation therefore is that community safety funding will take another hit over the course of 
the current parliament. 
 
Merseyside CSPs receive annual grants from the Merseyside PCC. The grants are used to provide 
services which aim to stop criminal activities before they are committed; reduce the risk of 
committing crime; and deal with issues after the occurrence of a problem.  
 
The five CSPs received around £2.1m Community Safety grant from the PCC in the 2015/16 financial 
year for a range of initiatives summarised in Appendices 1, 2, 3 and 4. It is important to note that 
the list of activities in the appendices is by no means exhaustive of all the programmes and projects 
delivered by the CSPs but it gives a snapshot. This information highlights some of the projects that 
could be under threat in the face of funding reduction. 
 
Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of community safety grants received by each CSP from the OPCC 
whilst Figures 4.1 to 4.3 help to give a snapshot of the key activity areas to which each CSP 
dedicated their funding.  
 
 
Implications for Austerity for Community Safety within Merseyside 
39 
 
Table 4.1: Shares of Community Safety Grants Received by Merseyside CSPs in the 2015/16 Financial Year 
CSP Grant Received (£) % Share 
Knowsley CSP 204,000 10 
Liverpool CSP 962,000 45 
Sefton CSP 374,000 18 
St. Helens CSP 197,000 9 
Wirral CSP 388,000 18 
Total 2,125,000 100 
 
Figure 4.1: Percentage of Community Safety Grants Used for Primary Activities (2015/16 Financial Year) 
 
Data Source: OPCC  
Note: Primary crime prevention activities are designed to stop crime before it occurs both in situational and social 
terms. 
 
Figure 4.2: Percentage of Community Safety Grants Used for Secondary Activities (2015/16 Financial Year) 
 
Data Source: OPCC  
Note: Secondary crime prevention activities are designed to change people at risk of committing or being the victims 
of crime. 
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Figure 4.3: Percentage of Community Safety Grants Used for Tertiary Activities (2015/16 Financial Year) 
 
Data Source: OPCC  
Note: Tertiary crime prevention activities deal with issues after the event. 
The remainder of this section of the report projects the expected scale of cuts to community safety 
funding within Merseyside from April 2016 onwards. This is followed by an assessment of the 
possible repercussions of further budget cuts. The section concludes by testing the rationale for 
additional cuts to community safety budgets against a framework of political, economic, social 
cultural and legislative drivers that undergird the overall well-being of the inhabitants of 
Merseyside.  
 
4.1. Projection of the Scale of Future Budget Cuts 
The future outlook for funding Community Safety Partners across Merseyside whilst not positive 
is now less bleak than feared at the time of the research. Local authorities indicated to us that they 
expected funding for community safety related services to contract by an average of 33% during 
the current parliament with the expected budget cuts ranging from around 20% to around 40%.  
However, the Chancellor’s promise in the 2015 Autumn spending review to protect police budgets 
has meant that Community Safety Funding cuts from the Office of the Police and Crime 
Commissioner (OPCC) will not now occur with funding levels for 2016/17 continuing at the same 
levels as for 2015 for Merseyside Police, the five local authorities and other partners. Furthermore, 
the latest local authority settlement has indicated that cuts will not be as great as expected in late 
2015. Another positive development which will offset the impact of the cuts, has been the 
introduction of longer term budgeting for local authorities which will provide greater certainty and 
enable more informed medium term planning. In future budgets will be set for a four year period. 
That said, continuing cuts of between 7-15% in the period 2015-2020 will still make it extremely 
difficult for Merseyside local authorities to sustain current funding levels, especially for 
discretionary rather than statutory services, and on the back of swingeing cuts in period 2010-2015.  
 
Youth Offending Services (YOS) across Merseyside are expecting budget reductions in the region 
of 20% - 30%. Like other organisations, the Merseyside YOS are already down to the bare bones. The 
Mayor of Liverpool has already openly declared that it is unlikely that Liverpool will be able to 
deliver statutory services by 2017. 
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The current budget of the Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service (MFRS) is around £60 million. It is 
expected that this will shrink to £56m by 2021. What is not immediately clear is whether budget 
cuts within the FRS will be front loaded or back loaded. If the bulk of the cuts take place in the first 
few years from April 2016, the challenges will be much greater. However, if the cuts take place a 
little later, the FRS may have just a little more room to manoeuvre. The current funding forecast 
suggests that the FRS may reduce their fire stations from 25 to 16 by 2020. 
 
Prior to the 2015 Comprehensive Spending Review, Merseyside Police were given warning that 
there would be cuts within the region of 25% to 40% over the four year period from April 2016 to 
March 2020. It was not known how the cuts will be spread out over the four years. However, due 
to a combination of the Paris attacks and sustained campaigning locally and nationally by the Police 
Federation, Crime Commissioners and also online public petitions spelling out the serious 
consequences of further cuts, the immediate past Chancellor opted not to cut the police budget 
further. In the eventual grant settlement, a modest 0.6% grant cut was offset fully by a modest 
increase in the local precept and use of reserves. While there is still the need to search for 
significant savings, changes and reforms, the announcement averted the threat of losing most if 
not all PCSOs, the loss of the mounted police and major cuts to teams tackling serious and 
organised crime, hate crime and investigation of rape and sexual offences.   
 
The other challenge confronting Merseyside Police has to do with the Police Allocation Formula 
(PAF). The government accepts that the current model is inappropriate. The PAF is not capable of 
estimating the total amount of central government funding required for the police. Rather, the 
formula was designed to determine allocations between the 43 police force areas of England and 
Wales once the total amount of central Government funding for the police has been confirmed 
(Home Office, 2015). Figure 4.4 provides a summary of the PAF computations. The way in which 
funding is allocated from central government to forces, although not perfect, has served 
Merseyside well because Merseyside’s allocation per head of population is the second largest in 
the country to the Metropolitan Police Service. The formula has been re-worked a couple of times. 
The most recent revision has seen Merseyside lose out about £3.5 million a year. This translates to 
roughly 5% year on year. The fairness of the process of re-calibrating the formulae is subject to 
debate and an ongoing review.  
 
Funding for social housing providers is essentially the income derived from rent paid by tenants. 
Whilst the government claim they pay a proportion of that through benefits, there are numerous 
tenants in social housing who do not receive any government benefits. Additionally, a quarter of 
tenants like elderly people on pensions receive only partial benefits. However, some government 
funds accrue to the social housing sector to develop new homes. When policies are put in place 
which impinge upon the income of social housing tenants who are on benefits, this also translates 
to a systematic cut in funding for the social housing sector. 
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Figure 4.4: The Process of Allocating Police Main Grants using the PAF 
 
        Source: Home Office 
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Additional pressure is being put on the social housing sector because the government seems to 
have reneged on an earlier agreement with stakeholders within the sector. During the last coalition 
government, a deal was done with social housing providers which enabled them to increase their 
rent on an annual basis. The increase was pegged to the Retail Price Index (RPI) plus 1%. Using this 
model, housing associations across Merseyside had a ten year plan for rent increase. However, 
following the change of government in 2015, the new government changed the policy and housing 
providers now have to effectively reduce their rent by 1% which will be compounded year on year 
for the next four years.  
 
4.2. Anticipated Consequences of Additional Cuts to Funding 
Based on discussions with key stakeholders on the MCSP, 2016/17 onwards is shaping up to be a 
period when many of them will have to make exceedingly difficult choices regarding the services 
they chose not to prioritise. The level of provision of some services has already been reduced 
during the last parliament. However, many more services may need to be cut altogether as a result 
of deeper budget cuts.  
 
The dimensions of the cuts are unlikely to present a universal picture and the consequences are 
likely to vary depending on the timing and level of exposure of each MCSP stakeholder to the cuts. 
Some stakeholders may feel the bite more significantly at the later stages of the parliament. 
Whatever the case, consultations with stakeholders reveal that all of them are planning for some 
degree of planning reduction in order to help bridge the budget gap. It is also vital to note that 
some of the forecasts used in Section 4.1 are illustrative. This implies that they may be subject to 
change following the delivery of the Autumn Statement in November 2015 by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. The fact that these figures may be subject to change certainly adds further uncertainty 
to the discomfort of MCSP stakeholders. 
 
For some stakeholders, additional funding cuts will mean an instant end to all discretionary services 
unless there is a strong business case not to end them. This literally means that public parks for 
instance will no longer be maintained. From a community safety perspective, this means that parks 
are likely to become overgrown, unsafe and less frequentable. There are other less obvious 
impacts of the reductions to local authority budgets that, although may be felt within a different 
portfolio, can have negative consequences for community safety.  
 
Shrinking budgets could trigger the adoption of more of a pan-Merseyside approach to many 
aspects of community safety. This approach certainly has major benefits for stakeholders but it is 
also important to be mindful of some of the challenges it may present. Local authorities receive 
additional funding for community safety activities on top of OPCC grant which is determined locally 
and based on local priorities which will place limits on the extent to which it will prove possible to 
pursue a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Also, community safety challenges vary in the districts because 
of their different character and make up. For instance, community safety challenges presented by 
night-time economies for various local authorities vary. For instance, the night time economy in 
Knowsley is miniscule compared to St. Helens where there is a busy town centre. The presence of 
a town centre also presents different substance abuse priorities for St. Helens when compared to 
Knowsley. So whilst budget cuts may point to the need for a more pan-Merseyside model of 
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community safety, it is important to be mindful of the gaps that such a model may inadvertently 
create and the limits of such an approach.   
 
Future budget cuts will also affect the ability of community safety stakeholders to commission 
services. For instance, in Liverpool, the CSP currently commissions the Fire Service Street 
Intervention Team to do work around Anti-social Behaviour. This would be at risk in future.  
 
Future budget cuts will impinge innovation and creativity amongst MCSP stakeholders. Hardly any 
of them would have the funds to experiment on alternative solutions. In a world gravitating 
towards evidence-based practice which is the corner stone for innovation and creativity, budget 
cuts could ultimately prove counter-productive and stifle any hopes of efficiency and effectiveness 
within the community safety sector. 
 
The City Council will experience huge change in the next few years. The number of city council staff 
supporting the CSP is always at risk of cuts along with other staff in the Council. Having a 
community safety unit is not considered a statutory duty even though having a partnership is. More 
favourable recent Government spending announcements since the interview, and decisions within 
the Council to protect the community safety function, have meant that cuts will be less severe than 
feared so there has been a reprieve for CSP support staff. 
 
The Drug Intervention Programme (DIP) may no longer be supported in the future, although it is 
perceived that funding for such a programme could be available via public health.  
 
A wide range of diversionary programmes for instance those linked to the bonfire night will have 
to be moved to the back burner. In addition to this, support will shrink for Integrated Offender 
Management Services in St. Helens for instance. 
 
On the Wirral, a community patrol service exists at the moment. There is debate about whether 
local authorities should be providing a community patrol service to support the sustainability of 
neighbourhood policing. Wirral’s intention is to build a project team for twelve months from 2016 
into 2017. One of the options on the table is that this service will cease to exist in future or 
alternatively work to a point where it funds itself. This will fundamentally change how Anti-social 
Behaviour services are delivered on the Wirral. 
 
Another future consequence of deeper cuts will be the rationalisation of research, data and 
intelligence services. Resources for such activities will take a hit and this will no doubt have 
consequences on evidence-based decision making. 
 
Ahead of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), Wirral Council were looking at an operating 
budget of around £200m of which possibly 90% may be ring-fenced around social health care issues. 
Therefore, anything that is statutory or targeted will be priorities but the danger is that the 
agencies that are tackling issues which do not quite qualify as statutory activities may disappear 
altogether which would inevitably pile pressure on the statutory and targeted services. 
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There is concern that a myriad of crime prevention activities will be forfeited as a result of future 
budget cuts. This could trigger a corresponding increase in young people coming into the criminal 
justice system and an increase in the more expensive statutory side of work. 
 
Given increasing calls for Bobbies on the beat, there is widespread relief that future police budget 
cuts will be much more modest and community policing will not therefore be hit as severely as 
once feared. There are a couple of emergencies and rapid response activities that require the 
visible presence of the police. However, there are many other ‘invisible’ activities that the police 
perform. For instance, the investigation of rape, domestic violence, sex offences, serious and 
organised crime and terrorism often takes place behind the scenes. Although the public do not see 
these activities because they are not overt policing, they still need to be done. Reconciling such 
demands with continued calls for police to respond to new forms of crime and maintain frontline 
policing will continue to prove challenging despite better recent news about future funding.  
 
From a comparative perspective, it is difficult to fully gauge the full impact of continued budgetary 
pressures on neighbourhood and other kinds of policing across the country because a lot of police 
forces are creating one pool of uniformed officers. Essentially, some of the forces are deciding 
when to undertake response activities and also when to undertake neighbourhood policing 
activities. Resources for these activities are drawn from the single pool of uniformed officers. 
Essentially, the lines are being blurred and although some forces are claiming they have actually 
got more people deployed in neighbourhood policing, the reality is that they don’t because the 
same officers have response responsibilities as well. 
 
The Independent Domestic Violence Advisory (IDVA) service which provides independent and 
impartial support for all high risk victims/survivors of domestic violence looks set to remain a 
priority for most CSP’s. 
 
Sefton CSP would also be hit by reductions in workforce numbers. The Sefton Borough Council 
which supports the CSP lost a third of its workforce over the course of the last parliament and 
more people are set to be made redundant during the current parliament and community safety 
staff are likely to have to share in the pain. 
 
The St. Helens CSP workforce is already a very small team. The current model being used to pay for 
staff is not exclusively linked to community safety grants or grants received from the OPCC. This 
gives the St. Helens CSP staff a little room to manoeuvre and staff do not appear to be immediately 
vulnerable to redundancy. However, they are not entirely shielded from any potential 
organisational-wide (across the Borough Council) restructure. 
 
Currently, the staff strength at Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) is 676 people. By the end 
of the current parliament, this could be reduced to around 476 Firefighters. Alongside the 
reduction in Firefighters, Merseyside FRS will also lose between 30 and 50 non-uniform staff. 
Merseyside Police is considering whether to go down the police officer route or the police staff 
route. Currently, there are three hundred and fifty PCSOs that cost Merseyside Police about £10m 
a year. The PCSOs are not likely to be made redundant in the light of the Autumn Statement. If they 
do not go, then there will still have to be reductions in police officer numbers. 
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4.3. Ameliorating the Impacts of Budget Cuts 
The challenge confronting MCSP stakeholders is to look forward rather than backwards and to 
continue to seek to introduce new approaches and methods of working after a period of sustained 
funding cuts and service rationalisation.  
 
In view of what lies ahead, MCSP stakeholders need to consider some possible coping mechanisms 
which may help to mitigate these pressures. In some scenarios, there is no doubt that universal 
strategies (Pan-Merseyside) will be required. In other situations, local circumstances will dictate 
the options available to stakeholders. A positive and constructive discussion needs to take place 
amongst the MCSP stakeholders to ensure a proper balance is struck between universal and 
competing demands. In the immediate future, there appears to be scope for closer collaborative 
working between community safety partners, joint commissioning of services in order to obtain 
best value and a consistent offer and adoption of common processes. 
 
Where a Pan-Merseyside strategy is pursued for instance, a more robust case could be made when 
trying to secure funding from non-traditional external donors to boost whatever comes through 
from central government. The findings of this study reveal that areas presenting common 
challenges for stakeholders include but are not limited to: 
 The exploitation of children and young people; 
 Domestic violence; 
 Hate crime; 
 Organised crime; and 
 Neighbourhood anti-social behaviour. 
 
The new funding climate will also require stakeholders to come up with innovative ways of 
dynamically undertaking needs assessments. Such assessments will help stakeholders determine 
collective and peculiar priorities and focus on core challenges. In Liverpool, the ruling party is not 
represented politically nationally. In a sense, this presents challenges as there is no voice to smooth 
the path of government and pressurise from the centre. 
 
Some partners did have proactive neighbourhood teams in the past. Such teams undertook a lot 
of engagement. Where there is still capacity, public engagement will be necessary in order to send 
out messages for instance on behavioural change.  
 
An additional difficulty is that stakeholders within the third sector still feel they can rely on the 
public sector agencies for funding. However, this has shrunk significantly. There is room for the 
public sector and the third sector to join forces to ensure that the necessary range of community 
safety data is collected to compensate for cutbacks in many agencies’ research and information 
teams and to provide collective evidence of policy’s impact on the lives of local residents (and its 
effectiveness), including the effect of spending cuts.  
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There are concerns with the future policing model which will result in a significant shift away from 
what is currently in operation. If there is a shift away from the current model, there will still be an 
appetite to deliver a local partnership programme to deal with issues locally. However, if the police 
are absent from the table, then the local knowledge, influence and ability to deal with certain key 
problems will be missing. 
 
Alternative delivery models will be required. Some stakeholders may consider outsourcing 
although that in itself does present challenges and is not always a cost-effective approach. A higher 
degree of transition towards the third sector and voluntary agencies may be preferred. 
 
There will always be debates and counter-debates around greater involvement and control of local 
issues by local communities. One of the suggestions put forward by a stakeholder in the course of 
this study is captured in the statement below: 
 
“There needs to be investment in changing the culture of our communities and our societies 
and I personally do not think there is anything bad in making our communities and societies 
self-sustainable. I think that is the model we should have always adopted when we were rich 
as well. We have got no money for them to invest to change the culture now so we are just 
going to force it upon them and that will put pressure on statutory services again because 
people will fall out of engagement” (Wirral CSP, 2015). 
 
Other measures that could be considered include: 
 Targeted interventions; 
 Improving data and information sharing protocols; and 
 Exploring co-creation with local authorities. 
 
The depth and breadth of budget cuts mean that a more joined-up public service driven by 
integration and collaborative ways of working is inevitable. The big picture emerging at this stage 
is that some form(s) of standardisation (which takes into account the individuality of each partner) 
in terms of organisational culture, strategic & operational definitions, measures and priorities is 
required in the immediate future. Such standardisation could ultimately strengthen 
interoperability and facilitate better collaborative working - a herculean task but certainly 
achievable. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
This study is the first attempt to capture the broad impact of austerity on multiple aspects of 
community safety within Merseyside. This report examined a wide range of comparative patterns 
of transition in income, spending and financial and service sustainability across the region since 
2010. 
 
The role of crime in influencing individual characteristics, family relations, attitudes to education 
and social networks means that successful early interventions may not only stimulate safety but 
could also have benefits on other areas such as life chances and aspirations. Cutting community 
safety funding crucial for some of these early interventions is therefore likely to prove 
counterproductive. 
 
We briefly examined some population profiles for the region alongside criminogenic issues. One 
of the most striking observations from the analysis is that scores of young people within the region 
remain out of employment, education or training. Despite the plethora of academic and policy 
publications calling for urgent action in this area, it is disheartening that the rate of NEETs within 
Merseyside is nearly double the national figure.  This continues to have severe implications both 
for individual young people and for the entire region. The link between high crime rates and young 
people in NEET status remains an area of serious policy concern. Attention has been drawn to 
understanding why some young people in high crime areas choose to disengage from education 
and employment and subsequently face social exclusion. 
 
In addition to exploring various ancillary secondary datasets, with the help of the Office of the 
Police and Crime Commissioner for Merseyside we gathered primary information directly from the 
key community safety sector stakeholders stationed across the region. This enabled us to gain 
insight into the financial challenges the community safety sector is experiencing and the different 
possible mechanisms that may be deployed towards managing the impact of funding cuts in 
future. 
 
We detected that the message emerging from central government towards MCSP stakeholders is 
that the community safety sector needs to pull itself up by its own bootstraps and introduce new 
ways of working and achieve new service efficiencies. However, stakeholder services within 
Merseyside are already stripped to the bone, which limits the scope for this to happen.    
 
At a time like this, we believe some form of sanguine leadership is required across the region - a 
form of leadership which values the best of what is, envisions what might be, engages in dialogue 
about what should be, and seeks to innovate. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Snapshot of Planned CSP Primary Projects for the 2015/16 Financial Year 
Victim-Focused Offender-Focused Location-Focused 
 Child Sexual Abuse 
Assemblies  
 Hate Crime: Stop Hate UK 
promotional materials, Body 
Cameras, CCTV installations 
 Young People’s Prevention 
Services and Substance 
Misuse Services (YOS) 
 Organised Crime Gangs 
promotional materials, 
events and school visits  
 Organised Crime Gangs 
projects linked to gun and 
gang crime which can be 
offered to schools  
 Drug Interventions: Funds 
‘Lifeline’ 
 Alcohol related crime  
 Support ‘Operation Stand’ 
and raise awareness via the 
‘One Punch can Kill’ 
campaign  
 Arson reduction activity by 
MF&RS staff targeted at 
young people involved or at 
risk of fire starting or fire 
related ASB  
 Positive Futures: 
Diversionary sports activity 
 Community Resilience: 
Promotional activity, 
reassurance events, social 
media presence, 
information website.  
 Business support including 
night-time economy, shop 
watch and taxi marshalling 
 Hate crime marketing 
campaigns and ‘Safer in 
Town’ initiative  
 Serious Acquisitive Crime: 
Identify and target harden 
acquisitive crime hotspot 
areas  
Notes: Primary activities are designed to stop criminogenic events before they occur 
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Appendix 2: Snapshot of Planned CSP Secondary Projects for the 2015/16 Financial Year 
Victim-Focused Offender-Focused Location-Focused 
 Coordination and 
administration of multi-
agency high risk victim 
conferences/multi-agency 
meetings 
 Youth Crime and Substance 
Misuse Prevention 
 Project development to 
tackle emerging issues 
identified gaps as 
appropriate. Areas may 
include a perpetrators 
programme, complex needs 
domestic violence pilot, 
serious organised crime, 
alcohol and mental health 
 Organised Crime Gangs: 
Development of a baseline 
academic report on the 
issue and suggestion of 
potential ways of working 
via research proven to work 
 Youth Offending Team: 
Tackling high risk 
perpetrators  
 Targets Class ‘A’ drug users 
by intervention through the 
Criminal Justice System to 
get offenders into effective 
treatment.  
 Prevent youth crime and 
substance misuse  
 Drug Intervention 
Programme 
 Youth Offending Services: 
Intervention work 
 REST Centre: Wet Facility for 
street drinkers  
 Fire Service’s Street 
Interventions Team to 
tackle ASB: to focus on 
areas of highest need 
identified by ASB problem 
profile 
Notes: Secondary activities are designed to help reduce risk 
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Appendix 3: Snapshot of Planned CSP Tertiary Projects for the 2015/16 Financial Year 
Victim-Focused Offender-Focused Location-Focused 
 Victim Support Service 
aimed at reducing re-
victimisation and 
challenging of offenders to 
reduce re-victimisation 
 Increase the capacity of the 
IDVA service for high-risk DV 
cases, including young 
person’s IDVA  
 ISVA Service for victims of 
sexual violence  
 DV (RASA) – Children’s ISVA  
 DV (RASA) - Resources for 
Children’s Service  
 Support Cabinet Member 
Working Group in their work 
regarding DV  
 Youth IDVA 
 VOMU and non-statutory 
work – probation staffing 
costs for partnership 
working. Focuses on prolific 
violent offenders enabling 
them to exit their offending 
behaviour and gain 
employment, training, 
overcome addictions etc.  
 VOMU and non-statutory 
work  
 Budget for VOMU and PPO 
Unit to spend on routes into 
education and employment   
 NOMS and CRC funded to 
assist in breaking the cycle 
of reoffending, Clear 
Choices programme  
 Probation/CTC staff 
attached to Integrated 
Offender Management Unit 
delivering interventions with 
identified prolific and 
priority offenders to reduce 
their offending and 
reoffending 
  
 Target Hardening: 
Improving the security of 
vulnerable victim’s 
properties to enable them 
to remain in their own home 
and prevent repeat crime 
and disorder  
 Flexible and responsive 
service to tackle issues in 
vulnerable locations 
identified through Problem 
Profiles, and support for 
vulnerable victims of 
Domestic Violence, Child 
Sexual Exploitation, Hate 
Crime and repeat ASB 
 Organised Crime Gangs: 
Community interventions 
reacting to incidents across 
the borough 
 Business Crime grant to 
small businesses suffering 
with crime and disorder 
 Target hardening for a 
number of properties to 
prevent re-victimisation for 
hate crime, victims of 
domestic violence and 
vulnerable people. 
Notes: Tertiary activities are designed to deal with issues after the occurrence of a criminogenic event 
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Appendix 4: Snapshot of Other Planned CSP Projects for the 2015/16 Financial Year 
Other Spend 
 Community Safety Partnership Training  
 High-risk vulnerable victim target hardening/emergency budget 
 Domestic Homicide Reviews 
 Strategic Programmes Management  
 Analytical services  
 Domestic Violence: DHR costs, contribution to IDVA provision and Domestic Violence Enforcement 
programme 
 ASB: Legal costs associated with the use of the council for ASB cases, marketing ‘Spring Watch - 
Spring’, ‘Safe Space - Summer’ and ‘Be the Good Guy  
 Stop Hate UK 
 Running costs (£9479.75) 
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